【讲座时间】2023年11月28日 9:30
【讲座地点】线上
【讲座主题】Common Ownership and Peer Selection in Relative Performance Evaluation
【嘉宾介绍】宫国瑾，康涅狄格大学会计学教授
Dr. Guojin Gong is the Professor of Accounting and Deloitte Foundation Faculty Fellow at the University of Connecticut. She earned her Ph.D. in Accounting from University of Iowa. Before joining UConn in 2020, she has taught at Pennsylvania State University since 2005. She has also been a visiting scholar in National University of Singapore (Singapore), Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (China), and Tsinghua University (China).
Dr. Gong’s research interests are in financial reporting and corporate governance, with a focus on executive compensation and disclosure choices. Her work has been published in leading academic journals including The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Finance, and Management Science, among others. She has won several awards for her research and is quoted in the press. She has served on the Editorial Board of Contemporary Accounting Research and as an Associate Editor for China Accounting and Finance Review. She is on the Editorial Board of Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance. She has also served as the President of the Chinese Accounting Professors’ Association of North America (CAPANA).
【内容提要】
Institutional investors often simultaneously hold large stakes in same-industry firms (hereafter common ownership). This study intends to explore the implications of common ownership for incentive contracting by examining the relation between common ownership and peer selection in relative performance evaluation (RPE). Theory posits that RPE may motivate managers to sabotage or cooperate with selected RPE peers. Consistent with a cooperative incentive, we find that an RPE firm with greater common ownership is more likely to select commonly-owned peers as RPE peers. This positive relation is stronger (weaker) when the RPE firm and a peer firm are strategic complements (substitutes). Path analyses suggest that common ownership, through influencing RPE peer selection, fosters cooperative relationship between the focal firm and its RPE peers. Collectively, our evidence highlights the importance of incentive contracting as a potential mechanism through which common ownership affects the cooperation and competition in the product market.
